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ABSTRACT
The present contribution intends to outline a European regulatory
strategy to address technological and legal challenges posed by
autonomous vehicles. Starting with a recent communication of the
European Commission, this Article provides a critical analysis of EU
policies on the legal issues of liability related to autonomous vehicles.
The ongoing discussions within national jurisdictions demonstrate that
a comprehensive plan to tackle the aforementioned problems is
missing. The efforts made by national legislators and scholars reveal a
patchwork of solutions, whereby everyone tries to find their own way
to balance innovation with the need to protect the interested persons.
It is however clear that the possible evolutions in the automotive sector
will mainly affect three branches of private law: traffic accident
liability, product liability, and insurance law. It is thus necessary to
understand whether private law needs to adapt its paradigms to the
technological developments under examination. In this respect, this
contribution tries to examine the main problematic aspects of the
actual legal framework at the national and European level. It goes then
further in presenting, through a two-steps approach, what traffic
liability may look like in the future, both in the short and in the long
term. The main findings of this Article are that in the near future no
dramatic changes are required, but just some minor amendments to
adapt the product liability regime to the technological changes; in the
more distant future, when users will demand autonomous vehicles
through their devices, there will be the need to fashion a new system of
traffic liability with compulsory insurance on manufactures, which will
become a prerequisite for the vehicle being in motion. Finally, this
Article advances some conclusions about the need to foster
comparative research on the examined issues.
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I. A SOFT APPROACH TO AN ENORMOUS CHALLENGE
The problems of tortious liability related to accidents involving
autonomous vehicles (“AVs”) have gained increasing attention in the
global context. Apart from economic and technological challenges, the
resolution of tort law and insurance law issues is of great importance
to provide certainty with respect to the economic consequences of
accidents. In this sense, the very central question when dealing with
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AVs before their launch in the market is: Who is liable for crashes? 1
This issue entails the resolution of other problematic aspects, such as
who should cover the risks, what the modalities for liability are, and
which interests have to be protected.
The European institutions seem to be aware that reasonable
answers to these questions are of dramatic importance for the future of
AVs. 2 In fact, it is widely acknowledged that autonomous driving will
bring benefits to society. 3 According to predictions, new technologies
should dramatically diminish the number of road accidents through the
elimination of human errors. 4 Moreover, they will improve traffic
* Associate Professor of Private Law, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy; Ph.D. Sapienza
Università di Roma, Rome, Italy; LL.M. Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Münster,
Germany; J.D. Università degli Studi Roma Tre, Rome, Italy. I am deeply grateful to Reinhard
Zimmermann, Jürgen Basedow and Klaus J. Hopt for their remarks during a Konzil held at the
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, where this paper was
presented in December 2018, as well as to Pietro Sirena and Francesco Mezzanotte for their
comments on earlier drafts.
1. See Jack Boeglin, The Costs of Self-Driving Cars: Reconciling Freedom and Privacy
with Tort Liability in Autonomous Vehicle Regulation, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 171, 174 (2015)
(“Though manufacturers, insurers, news outlets, and academics have all posed this question,
they have not found easy answers”). See also Jessica S. Brodsky, Autonomous Vehicle
Regulation: How an Uncertain Legal Landscape May Hit The Brakes on Self-Driving Cars, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 851, 853 (2016) (“Scholars have speculated about how exactly the law
should and will handle the introduction of autonomous vehicles, reaching differing and often
contradictory conclusions and suggestions”).
2. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions “On the road to
automated mobility: An EU strategy for mobility of the future”, COM (2018) 283 final 11 (May
17, 2018) [hereinafter EU Strategy for Mobility].
3. Frank Douma, Adeel Lari & Kory Andersen, The Legal Obligations, Obstacles, and
Opportunities for Automated and Connected Vehicles to Improve Mobility and Access for
People Unable to Drive, MICH. ST. L. REV. 75, 92–96 (2017); Jeremy A. Carp, Autonomous
Vehicles: Problems and Principles for Future Regulation, 4 U. PA. J.L. & PUB. AFF. 81, 87–92
[iv] (2018). See also David Levinson, Climbing Mount Next: The Effects of Autonomous
Vehicles on Society, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 787, 794–806 (2015). For a different view, see
Gregory H. Shill, Should Law Subsidize Driving?, 95 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 5) http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3345366 [https://perma.cc/AYP5-VP6X]
(arguing that automobile’s social costs are in part encouraged by the law and that AVs “may
reduce collisions but likely won’t mitigate the other costs”)
4. According to data provided by the World Health Organization, every year over 1.2
million people die as a result of car accidents. It is stated that 90% of accidents each year are
caused by human error. The figure is at 95% according to the Report from the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council Saving Lives: Boosting Car Safety in the EU
Reporting on the monitoring and assessment of advanced vehicle safety features, their cost
effectiveness and feasibility for the review of the regulations on general vehicle safety and on
the protection of pedestrians and other vulnerable road users, COM (2016) 787 final 4 (Dec.
12, 2016).
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flows, provide for social inclusion in rural areas and cities, and act in
favor of aging and disabled persons. The automation of vehicles could
eventually produce additional positive changes if linked to the sharing
economy and the decarbonization of transport in pursuit of a zeroemission society.
The European Commission intervened in the Declaration of
Amsterdam of 2016 and agreed with some Member States and part of
the industry on joint goals and actions to facilitate the introduction of
connected and automated driving. 5 The indications on the future legal
framework are rather generic. The document states only that “the legal
framework should offer sufficient flexibility to accommodate
innovation, facilitate the introduction of connected and automated
vehicles on the market and enable their cross-border use.” 6 In drafting
an agenda to plan the steps to be taken in view of automated mobility,
the European Commission assumes a clearer position in declaring that
“no changes are necessary as regards autonomous vehicles.”7
Apparently, the Commission believes that the still existent Motor
Insurance Directive, 8 as well as interpretative guidance concerning the
Product Liability Directive, 9 are sufficient tools to tackle the evolutions
in the transport sector.
The launch of AVs will mainly affect three different branches of
private law: traffic accident liability, product liability, and insurance
law. The aim of the present contribution is to evaluate whether the soft
approach laid down by the European Commission is appropriate. In
what follows, the prevailing paradigms of regulations will be analyzed.
European and some national rules will be scrutinized to assess if it is
necessary to work on a normative framework at a European and
national level, one adequate to face the future challenges in the area of
AV accident liability.
5. Declaration of Amsterdam of 14-5 April 2016 “Cooperation in the field of connected
and automated driving.”
6. Id. II a.
7. EU Strategy for Mobility, supra note 2.
8. Directive 2009/103, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Sept. 16, 2009
Relating to Insurance Against Civil Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of the Use of
Motor Vehicles, and the Enforcement of the Obligation to Insure Against such Insure Against
Such Liability, 2009 O.J. (L 263) 11 (EC).
9. Council Directive 85/374 of July 25, 1985, on the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 (EEC).
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II. THE MOTOR INSURANCE DIRECTIVE: A SHADOW TORT
LAW REGIME?
The statements of the European Commission cannot be
understood without a quick analysis of the Motor Insurance Directive,
which provides for the compulsory insurance of vehicles within the
European Union and a direct claim of the victim against the insurer
covering the liable person. 10 Pursuant to the Directive, each EU
Member State is to act appropriately to ensure that civil liability in
respect of the use of vehicles normally based in its territory is covered
by insurance. In accordance with the law in force in other Member
States, such insurance is to cover any loss or injury which is caused in
the territory of those States. The compulsory insurance covers both
damage to property and personal injuries. Moreover, the Directive
indicates minimum amounts that should be covered by the compulsory
insurance, 11 and it obliges the Member States to set up a body having
the task of providing compensation for damage caused by an
unidentified vehicle or a vehicle for which the insurance obligation has
not been satisfied. 12
In the interest of the victims, the Motor Insurance Directive
obliges the Member States to set up a compensation procedure,
according to which the insurance undertaking of the person who caused
the accident or its claims representative is required to make an offer of
compensation where the liability is not contested and the damages have
been quantified. Conversely, if liability is denied or has not been clearly
determined or the damages have not been fully quantified, the
insurance undertaking to whom the claim for compensation has been
addressed is required to provide a reasoned reply to the points made in
the claim.
The systems based on compulsory insurance, even if operating
with private law instruments, have gained a bureaucratic character.13
The frequent occurrence of accidents makes it inefficient to treat cases
involving accident liability on an individual basis. Often liability issues
concerning motor cars are resolved directly by insurance companies
10. Directive 2009/103, art. 5, 2009 O.J. (L 263) 11, 17 (EC).
11. Id. art. 9.
12. Id. art. 10.
13. Wolfgang Ernst, General Introduction: Legal Change? Railway and car accidents and
How the Law Coped with Them, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRAFFIC LIABILITY 1, 7 (Wolfgang
Ernst ed., 2010).
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through a schematic standard procedure. 14 This bureaucratization
based on the insurance industry is a common future within Europe;
nonetheless, from a formal and technical point of view in matters of
tort law, relevant distinctions between legal systems are still existent
and are resistant to change. 15 Compulsory insurance does not transform
a system based on the liability of the driver or the keeper into a no-fault
system independent of any basis for attribution; 16 the insurer simply
replaces the insured party in any tort claim that may arise. Nevertheless,
all around Europe, compulsory insurance is seen as a tool to protect
victims of road traffic accidents, rather than an instrument to protect
the keeper. 17 Such an understanding of compulsory insurance creates
hybrid systems based on tort law and insurance law, which of course
influence the outcome of the cases, making it arduous to escape from
liability. 18
It is possible to assume that details of tort liability in the different
EU Member States do not significantly affect the overall functioning
of the compensation procedures, which have proven to be efficient due
to the regulation of insurance. In this sense, it has been claimed that the
Motor Insurance Directive represents a “shadow tort regime.”19
Notwithstanding the risks of moral hazard, through the minimum
coverages and the spreading of losses in the community of drivers, the
described mechanism solves the problem of undercompensation. 20 It
also permits an internalization of the risks through the payment of the
insurance premium. Insurers can play an important role in seeing that
14. See Simon Halliday et al.,, Street-Level Tort Law: The Bureaucratic Justice of Liability
Decision-Making, 75 MODERN L. REV. 347, 355-56 (2012).
15. Ernst, supra note 13, at 10–11. See also infra Part III.
16. See e.g., for comparative remarks, VALENTINA V. CUOCCI, DALL’ASSICURAZIONE
OBBLIGATORIA R.C. AUTO ALLA NO-FAULT INSURANCE 119–94 (2013) (Ita.).
17. On the aims of compulsory liability insurance, see Michael Faure, Compulsory
Liability Insurance: Economic Perspectives, in COMPULSORY LIABILITY INSURANCE FROM A
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 319, 320–22 (Attila Fenyves et al. eds., 2016).
18. Cf. Gerhard Wagner, Tort Liability and Insurance: Comparative Report and Final
Conclusions, in TORT LAW AND LIABILITY INSURANCE 307, 317 (2005).
19. James Davey, A Compulsory Diet of Chickens and Eggs: The EU Motor Insurance
Directives as a Shadow Tort Regime, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU TORT LAW 239, 240–
243 (Paula Gilker ed., 2017). For the assumption that the understanding of a tort law system
requires an analysis of the practice of insurance companies, see Mauro Bussani & Marta
Infantino, Tort Law and Legal Cultures, 63 A.J. COMP. L. 77, 80–83 (2015). Specific differences
between European legal systems in the area of traffic liability are indicated by CHRISTOPH
OERTEL, OBJEKTIVE HAFTUNG IN EUROPA 103–06 (2010) (Ger.).
20. Faure, supra note 17, at 320.
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proper care is taken so as to avoid accidents by imposing contractual
conditions that discourage wrongful and potentially injurious behavior.
Such influences of insurance law on tort law may also be explained in
the light of social advantages and economic efficiency. 21
Given the profound modifications in the automotive sector, it is
questionable whether the described shadow tort regime is sufficient to
assure certainty and equal treatment of injured persons in Europe. With
AVs, the keeper/owner becomes a potential victim of her own car. In
addition, competition between internal market manufacturers will be
impacted by a significant new element: nowadays there is little if any
relation between manufacturers and cases involving car accidents, 22 but
in the future things may change since the software embedded in the
vehicles means the driving task will be under their responsibility. With
a new main character on the scene, the manufacturer, it seems uncertain
whether the Motor Insurance Directive can provide for a clear and
correct allocation of the risks and boost competition within the internal
market. If the Member states do not adopt a harmonized system of
liability for AVs, damages claims against manufactures will be
assessed through different criteria depending on the applicable national
law.
III. SUBSTANTIVE TORT LIABILITY RULES
To understand how the legal landscape of AVs might appear, one
has to consider how national legal systems currently deal with accident
liability where a motor car is involved and how they plan to adapt the
law to the new technologies. Due to the differences, the focus here will
be put on examples from civil law and common law that adopt different
grounds of liability. The discussions, proposals and enactment of new
laws by some national legal systems demonstrate that AVs necessarily
will influence substantive tort law.
21. Cf. Willem H. van Boom, Insurance Law and Economics: an Empirical Perspective,
in ESSAYS IN THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF REGULATION. IN HONOUR OF ANTHONY OGUS 253,
254–59 (Michael Faure & Frank H. Stephens eds., 2008); Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, The
Law and Economics of Liability Insurance: A Theoretical and Empirical Review, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORT 169, 183–85 (Jennifer H. Arlen ed., 2013); Ina Ebert,
Tort Law and Insurance, in COMPARATIVE TORT LAW. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 144–50 (Mauro
Bussani & Anthony J. Sebok eds., 2015).
22. See, for relevant data, Lennart S. Lutz, Autonome Fahrzeuge als rechtliche
Herausforderung, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 119 (2015) (Ger.).
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A. Divergent Rules across Europe
Due to its inherent risks, driving a car exposes people to the
possibility of becoming a tortfeasor. The industrial revolution and the
rise of the automobile industry demanded legislative intervention.
Evolutions in the law were not fast, and it took time for legal systems
to provide a response to societal needs. 23 In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, European legal systems followed different
paradigms, 24 and nowadays within the non-harmonized area of law,
there are similarities and divergences between the Member States. 25
This is understandable because the earlier role of EU law and
comparative research was of course not the same as today. The actual
standpoint is different than the one which existed when the rules on car
accident liability were first enacted. Even if not comparable to the work
done in the area of contract law,26 scholars long ago began to discuss
specific issues of tort liability within international groups and drafted
the Principles of European Tort Law. 27 Nevertheless, with respect to
the great challenges of the AVs that affect the economy of the
continent, many scholars and institutions are currently engaged in
isolated national discourse.
B. The French and the German System: Strict Liability of the Keeper
The first reference when dealing with accident liability in the
French legal system is law no. 85-677 of 5 July 1985, the so-called “loi
23. Ernst, supra note 15, at 5–11.
24. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION at 1017–30 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1990); Gerhard Wagner,
Comparative Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 994, 998–1001
(Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2d ed. 2019).
25. Compare Hein Kötz, Liability for Motor-Vehicle Accidents in Europe: Recent Reforms
and Reform Proposals in 2 STUDI IN MEMORIA DI GINO GORLA 1441, 1455–58 (A. Giuffrè ed.,
1994); CEES VAN DAM, EUROPEAN TORT LAW 408–17 (2d ed. 2013); Ernst Karner, A
Comparative Analysis of Traffic Accident Systems, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 365, 368–72
(2018).
26. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, The Present State of European Private Law, 57 A.J.
COMP. L. 479, 494–96 (2009); PIETRO SIRENA, Die Rolle wissenschaftlicher Entwürfe im
europäischen Privatrecht, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEUP] 838, 847
(2018) (Ger.).
27. See Bernhard A. Koch, The “European Group on Tort Law” and its “Principles of
European Tort Law”, 53 A.J. COMP. L. 189, 189 (2005). See also Marta Infantino, Making
European Tort Law: The Game and Its Players, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 45, 60–65
(2010).
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Badinter,” devoted especially to “victims of a traffic accident in which
a motor vehicle is implicated.” 28 The primary rule of the regulation is
that the victim of the accident in which a motor vehicle is involved is
entitled to sue the driver and the keeper for compensation, whereby it
is not necessary to demonstrate that the vehicle caused the accident.29
According to the aforementioned statute, the driver and the keeper can
be exonerated from liability only if they demonstrate that the victim
intentionally sought (recherché) the suffered damage or that the
victim’s faute inexcusable was the sole cause of the accident. 30 For the
driver of a motor vehicle who suffers damage from a road traffic
accident, the amount of compensation is reduced if she has committed
a faute. 31
A study group of scholars has recently proposed a window
dressing of the aforementioned regime. 32 With respect to the loi
Badinter, a new definition of driver should be adopted: the one who
initiates the operating system of an AV. 33 In addition, the rule on
contributory negligence should not apply to a “driver” of an AV. 34

28. See FRANÇOIS CHABAS, LE DROIT DES ACCIDENTS DE LA CIRCULATION APRES LA
REFORME DU 5 JUILLET 1985 1–52 (2d ed. 1988); GENEVIEVE VINEY, L’INDEMNISATION DES
VICTIMES D’ACCIDENTS DE LA CIRCULATION 1–36 (1992); from a comparative perspective,

Ruth Redmond-Cooper, The Relevance of Fault in Determining Liability for Road Accidents:
The French Experience, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 502, 508–20 (1989).
29. See Jean-Sébastian Borghetti, Extra-Strict Liability for Traffic Accidents in France, 53
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 265, 276–77 (2018).
30. Law 85-677 of July 5, art. 3(1) (1985).
31. Id. art. 4.
32. See generally LIONEL ANDREU et al., DES VOITURES AUTONOMES. UNE OFFRE DE LOI
(2018).
33. Id. at 184: “Ajouter un alinéa 2 à l’article 2 de la loi du 5 juillet 1985: « Les victimes,
y compris les conducteurs, ne peuvent se voir opposer la force majeure ou le fait d’un tiers par
le conducteur ou le gardien d’un véhicule mentionné à l’article 1er. Est réputé conducteur celui
qui active le système de conduite autonome d’un véhicule terrestre à moteur»” (Adding a 2d
sentence to article 2 of Law July 5, 1985: “It is prohibited for the driver or the keeper of a vehicle
mentioned in article 1, to oppose to the harmed persons, included the drivers, the force majeure
or the fact of a third. The persons who starts the driverless system of a motor vehicle is
considered the driver”).
34. Id.: “Ajouter un alinéa 2 à l’article 4 de la loi du 5 juillet 1985: « La faute commise
par le conducteur du véhicule terrestre à moteur a pour effet de limiter ou d’exclure
l’indemnisation des dommages qu’il a subis. L’alinéa précédent n’est pas applicable au
conducteur d’une voiture autonome qui, au moment de l’accident, était autorisé à ne pas
contrôler le comportement du véhicule» ” (Adding a 2d sentence to article 4 of Law July 5, 1985:
“The fault committed by the driver of a motor vehicle limits or excludes the recovery of the
damage that he or she has suffered. The precedent paragraph is not applicable to a driver of an
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German law provides for a similar regulation in the Road Traffic
Act (Straßenverkehrsgesetz, “StVG”), enacted in 1952. 35 The StVG
states that the keeper of a motor vehicle is liable for damages caused in
the course of its operation (Betriebsgefahr) unless she can prove an
external cause. 36 The driver is jointly liable with the keeper, but she can
escape from liability by proving that she did not cause the damage
intentionally or negligently. The differences between the German and
the French regime are not significant, and also the Italian Civil code
contains similar rules. 37 Legal scholars are of the view that the system
of liability will be able to work properly also with AVs. As it will be
seen, 38 the insurance company may ultimately sue the manufacturer for
relief if the damage was caused by its defective product. Such liability
systems may have the advantage of permitting a coexistence with
conventional vehicles, for which the behavior of the driver will still
remain of importance. Whereas the liability of the driver will no longer
be of relevance in assessing liability issues concerning AVs, the keeper
will continue to bear the risks that must be covered through compulsory
insurance.
C. United Kingdom: From the Duty of Care to the Automated and
Electric Vehicles Act 2018
A divergent system of liability was adopted in England and
Wales, where the strict liability doctrine was rejected in favor of a
system based on the duty of care of the driver. 39 In the presence of a
autonomous vehicle, who, at the moment of the accident, was authorized not to control the
behavior of the vehicle”).
35. The above-mentioned Act has replaced the Motor Vehicle Act of 1909
(Kraftfahrzeuggesetz). See Sebastian Lohsse, Development of Traffic Liability in Germany, in
THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRAFFIC LIABILITY, 75, 93 (2010).
36. § 7 (1) StVG. According to § 7(2) StVG, the duty to compensate is excluded if “the
accident was caused by an unavoidable event which is not due to a defect in the construction of
a vehicle or to the failure of its mechanism.” See BASIL S. MARKESINIS ET AL., MARKESINIS’S
GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 167-69 (5th ed. 2019).
37. See C.c., art. 2054. Cf. CESARE M. BIANCA, DIRITTO CIVILE, 5, LA RESPONSABILITÀ
(2d ed. 2012) 354–56; PIETRO TRIMARCHI, LA RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE: ATTI ILLECITI, RISCHIO,
DANNO 397-98 (2d ed. 2019).
38. See infra Part IV.A.
39. Wolfgang Ernst, General Introduction: Legal Change? Railway and car accidents and
How the Law Coped with Them, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRAFFIC LIABILITY 1, 7 (Wolfgang
Ernst ed., 2010). From a comparative perspective, cf. 2 CHRISTIAN VON BAR, THE COMMON
EUROPEAN LAW OF TORTS at 405 (2000) (describing the regime as a result of “One of the
unfortunate developments of the English law”). Cf. also the case of Israel: Ronen Perry, From
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compulsory insurance regime, the differences with the continental
systems (at least from a practical point of view) seem not significant,
because third party motor insurance highly influences the outcome of
cases. 40 Nevertheless, a fault-based system which relies on drivers’
standards of care is obviously inapt for AVs. 41 In addition, negligence
liability requires evidence of how the accident occurred, which often
depends on witnesses and technicalities, and the burden of proof is on
the victim. 42
UnsurprisinglyNot surprisingly, the legislature intervened with
the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018 of 19 July 2018.
Through a re-conceptualization of road traffic liability, the recent Act
places liability on the insurer “where an accident is caused by an
automated vehicle when driving itself on a road or other public place
in Great Britain.” 43 When the vehicle is not insured, the owner is liable
for the damage. 44 The amount of liability is reduced in cases of
contributory negligence. 45 Special rules are devoted to accidents
resulting from unauthorized software alterations or a failure to update

Fault-Based to Strict Liability: A Case Study of an Overpraised Reform, 53 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 383, 394–98 (2018).
40. See e.g. Lord Denning in Morris v. Ford Motor Co. Ltd [1973] Q.B. 792, at 798: “The
damages are expected to be borne by the insurers. The courts recognize this every day. They
would not find negligence so readily – or award sums of such increasing magnitude – except on
the footing that the damages are to be borne, not by the man himself, but by an insurance
company.” For an overall assessment, cf. John R. Spencer, Motor-cars and the Rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher: A Chapter of Accidents in the History of Law and Motoring, 42 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
65, 80 (1983).
41. Cf. Ernst Karner & Lukas Schellerer, Non-Contractual Liability for Railways, Buses
and Aeroplanes, 9 J. EUR. TORT L. 143, 151 (2018) (arguing that in the field of self-driving
vehicles the English fault liability system “leads to serious gaps in protection”).
42. See, on liability issues related to AVs, Andrew D. Selbst, Negligence and AI’s Human
Users, 100 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 9) (on file with author). See
generally, on the burden of proof in English common law of negligence, RICHARD A. BUCKLEY,
THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE AND NUISANCE 2.21 (6th ed., 2017). For comparative remarks and
on the possibility of reversals of the burden of proof in presence of defective products, see
generally Helmut Koziol, Comparative conclusions, in BASIC QUESTIONS OF TORT LAW FROM
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 685, 801–02 (Helmut Koziol ed., 2015). On the immanence of
corrective justice in negligence liability and the impact of reversals of the burden of proof, see
ERNEST J., WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 154–55 (2012).
43. Automated
and
Electric
Vehicles
Act
2018,
c.
18,
§
2(1),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/18/contents/enacted.
[https://perma.cc/MS3ZDTNY].
44. Id. § 2(2).
45. Id. § 3.
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“safety-critical” software. 46 Finally, the insurer and the owner of the
vehicle may file a claim against any other person liable to the injured
party in respect of the accident. 47 Through this Act, the British law
adopts a strict liability system which, with respect to the general ground
for liability, does not differ so much from the continental systems based
on the strict liability of the keeper. It should be noted that behind the
insurer, mentioned by the Act of 2018, lies a policy-holder, who usually
is the vehicle’s keeper. Compared to the French and the German
models, the advantage here is that in the event of an accident also the
owner/keeper can technically be considered a victim for which the
insurer is liable. Moreover, it should be welcomed that the position of
the driver is no longer taken into consideration in the legal framework.
The Automated and Electric Vehicles Act avoids creating a “fictitious”
or “artificial” driver, as is the case in a recent proposal of French
scholars. 48 Where an operating system autonomously executes the task
of driving, there can no longer be a human driver.
IV. THE PRODUCT LIABILITY REGIME
The point of reference in Europe is, of course, the Product
Liability Directive of 1985. As is well known under the Directive, a
product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person
is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, this
including the presentation of the product, the reasonable use of the
product, and the time when the product was put on the market. 49 The
victim bears the burden of proof with respect to the actual damage, a
defect in the product and a causal link between the damage and the
defect. Even though there is not an onus to prove the manufacturer’s
negligence or fault, it could be hard for the victim to fulfill the
aforementioned requirements.
In general terms, it is questionable whether the European product
liability regime could be a useful tool to regulate AVs’ accident
liability. Moreover, at an institutional level, it is currently discussed
whether the more than three-decade regime needs to be updated

46. Id. § 4.
47. Id. § 5.
48. See ANDREU et al., supra note 32, at 86–92. The text of the relevant provision proposed
by the French group of scholars is reported supra note 33.
49. Council Directive 85/374, art. 6, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31 (EEC).
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through a new legislative instrument that is capable of facing the more
recent technological developments. 50
A. The Manufacturer not at the Forefront
The absence of a driver is the most evident distinction between
AVs and conventional vehicles. This leads one immediately to think
that in cases of accidents involving AVs the manufacturer of the vehicle
will be the liable party. In the European context, the product liability
regime is at the moment being analyzed in order to understand whether
it could eventually cope with the rise of self-driving technologies and
provide convincing solutions. 51 It is assumed that product liability will
gain much more importance than in the current situation.52
Nevertheless, within countries that impose strict liability on the
owner/keeper—because of the onus of proving a defect in the product
and the other elements of civil liability—it would be foolish for victims
to bring a claim against the manufacturer and not against the
owner/keeper. 53 In addition, compulsory insurance guarantees that
damage suffered by the victim is covered.54 In such legal systems,
product liability could have a pivotal role only for the insurance
company when it comes to seeking relief from the manufacturer. 55
50. The Commission has set up an expert group on liability and new technologies (see
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=
3592) [https://perma.cc/536C-75S4]. The group has 2 formations. The “product liability
formation” will assist the Commission in drawing up guidance on the Directive. The “new
technologies formation” will assess the implications of emerging digital technologies for the
wider liability frameworks at EU and national level.
51. Cf. Christian Gomille, Herstellerhaftung für automatisierte Fahrzeuge, 71
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 76, 77–80 (2016) (Ger.); Gerhard Wagner, Produkthaftung für
autonome Systeme, 217 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS (ACP) 708, 724 (2017) (Ger.).
For a broader perspective, see also Marta Infantino & Weiwei Wang, Algorithmic Torts: A
Prospective Comparative Overview, 29 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming
2019) (unpublished manuscript at 21–24) (on file with authors).
52. See Martin Ebers, Autonomes Fahren: Produkt und Produzentenhaftung, in
AUTONOMES FAHREN. RECHTSFOLGEN, RECHTSPROBLEME, TECHNISCHE GRUNDLAGEN 93, 96
(Bernd H. Oppermann & Jutta Stender-Vorwachs eds., 2017) (Ger.). For the U.S., see Kyle
Colonna, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 81, 114–
16 (2012); Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving and Product Liability, MICH. ST. L. REV.
1, 30–32 (2017); Madeline Roe, Who’s Driving That Car: An Analysis of Regulatory and
Potential Liability Frameworks for Driverless Cars, 60 B.C. L. REV. 317, 327–34 (2019).
53. Wagner, supra note 51, at 760.
54. Id.
55. See,
especially
in
German
literature,
Christian
Armbrüster,
Verantwortungsverlagerungen und Versicherungsschutz – Das Beispiel des automatisierten
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It is true that a complete shift in liability towards the manufacturer
may disincentivize investing in new technologies, 56 but allowing the
latter to easily exempt liability may considerably impact on AVs’ social
desirability. People need to trust in manufacturers and in the fact that
they are ready to cover the unavoidable losses that will arise because
of the vehicles. At any rate, it appears correct to affirm that the actual
state of the art regarding product liability on a European level does not
require a reduction of AV manufacturers’ liability to boost innovation.
On the other hand, it also appears correct to affirm that the already
existing product liability regime could serve an important preventive
effect with respect to AV manufacturers and induce them to take
reasonable care in order to avoid defects. 57 Taking all this into
consideration, when dealing with AVs in the European context, the
issue related to the Product Liability Directive should be somewhat
reversed. It is not a matter of deciding whether to exempt
manufacturers from liability, but to verify if the protection granted by
the Directive is adequate, 58 and if it provides for satisfactory
incentives. 59
B. An Ancient Piece of Legislation
The Product Liability Directive of 1985 took into consideration
the “increasing technicality” and the need for “a fair apportionment of
the risks inherent in modern technological production.” 60 Nevertheless,
after more than thirty years, evolutions in technology make the
Fahrens, in INTELLIGENTE AGENTEN UND DAS RECHT 205, 216–17 (Sabine Gless & Kurt
Seelmann eds., 2016); Gomille, supra note 51, at 81; Wagner, supra note 51, at 758, 760–61;
Ebers, supra note 52, at 98.
56. Melinda F. Lohmann, Liability Issues Concerning Self-Driving Vehicles, 7 EUR. J.
RISK REG. 335, 338 (2016).
57. Wagner, supra note 51, at 762. See also Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and
the Law of Humans, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EUROPÄISCHES PRIVATRECHT [ZEuP] 766, 771–72
(2017) (declaring that without liability the manufacturers “would have the wrong incentives”).
Compare this opinion with the opinion expressed in Colonna, supra note 52, at 118.
58. See VON BAR, supra note 39, at 412–14 (explaining that a possible lack of protection
affects the passengers of the vehicle. As they participate in the risk of using a motor vehicle,
legal systems traditionally put them in a less advantageous position than the third parties
involved in accidents).
59. See Erica Palmerini & Andrea Bertolini, Liability and Risk Management in Robotics,
in DIGITAL REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE 225, 253–54 (Reiner
Schulze & Dirk Staudenmayer eds., 2016).
60. Council Directive 85/374, 2d recital, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 29 (EEC).
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Directive an outdated construction incapable of tackling the
fundamental problems that could arise from software embedded in AVs
that operate independently in the public space. 61 As it was stated
several times among legal scholars, placing the onus of proof on the
victim could hinder the effectiveness of the Directive. 62 Some of the
issues may be solved through very strict safety requirements that
necessarily will be enacted in order to assure an appropriate level of
safety. In addition, compulsory insurance would avoid the possibility
of undercompensation. 63 At any rate, the Product Liability Directive
does not comprise an effective measure to protect injured people in the
sector of AVs. 64
Unlike other branches where the “internet of things” is involved,
there is not inadequate protection of victims due to the presence of the
traffic liability regime and mandatory insurance. 65 Nevertheless, some
rules contained in the Product Liability Directive pose serious concerns
61. Tom M. Gasser, Fundamental and Special Questions for Autonomous Vehicles, in
AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 523, 525 (Markus Maurer
et al. eds., 2016). See also Antonio Davola & Roberto Pardolesi, In viaggio col robot: verso
nuovi orizzonti della r.c. auto (driverless)?, DANNO E RESPONSABILITÀ [DANNO E RESP.] 616,
627–29 (2017) (Ita.); MARIA C. GAETA, LIABILITY RULES AND SELF-DRIVING CARS: THE
EVOLUTION OF TORT LAW IN THE LIGHT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 140–41 (Editoriale Scienifica
ed. 2019). Decades of legal scholarship discuss the applicability of the Product Liability
Directive to software and artificial intelligence: see Simon Whittaker, European Product
Liability and Intellectual Products, 105 L.Q. REV. 125 (1989); K. Alheit, The Applicability of
the EU Product Liability Directive to Software, 34 COMP. & INT’L L.J. SOUTHERN AFR. 188
(2001); Andrea Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic Analysis of Robotic
Applications and Liability Rules, 5 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 214, 235–42 (2013).
62. See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the
European Economic and Social Committee on the Application of the Council Directive on the
approximation of the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning liability for defective products (85/374/EEC), at 6, COM (2018) 246 final 6 (May 7,
2018) (stating that “[o]verall, the Directive can be considered to contribute to a reasonable
balance between protecting those who suffer injury and ensuring fair competition on the single
market. However, some of the Directive’s concepts require guidance and/or clarification as they
hamper the effectiveness of the Directive. In particular, a better common understanding of what
is meant by “product”, “damage” and “defect” as well as clarifications on the burden of proof
would render the Directive’s application more effective.”
63. See supra Part II.
64. See e.g., ENFORCEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONSUMER LAW (Hans-Wolfgang
Micklitz & Geneviève Saumier eds., 2018) (providing a comparative law perspective).
65. Gunther Teubner, Digitale Rechtssubjekte? Zum privatrechtlichen Status autonomer
Softwareagenten, 218 ARCHIV FÜR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP]155, 159 (2018) (Ger.). On
the same issue, see also Christiane Wendehorst, Consumer Contracts and the Internet of Things,
in DIGITAL REVOLUTION: CHALLENGES FOR CONTRACT LAW IN PRACTICE, supra note 59, at
189, 195–96 (referring to a “dispersion of responsibility”).

140

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:1

with respect to the protection of injured parties. 66 First of all, it appears
difficult to accept that, given the possibility of updating the software, a
product cannot be considered defective for the sole reason that a better
product is subsequently put into circulation. 67 In addition, it seems
quite easy for the manufacturer to escape liability by proving that,
“having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect which
caused the damage did not exist at the time when the product was put
into circulation by him or that this defect came into being afterwards,”68
or that “the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when
he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the
existence of the defect to be discovered.” 69
In the long run, a modification or a clarification of the rules will
be needed in order to assess with a higher degree of certainty when the
manufacturer is liable. 70 A detailed analysis of all the issues related to
product liability would be beyond the scope of the present contribution.
It nevertheless seems of interest to analyze some of the issues that
recently were discussed with respect to the liability of AV
manufacturers.
C. Some Issues to be Resolved
In the following sections, three examples of possible interventions
on a European level will be presented in respect of AV liability issues:
first, a case in which there is a need to eliminate a provision; second, a
case in which a consistent interpretation of an existing provision is
needed; and third, a case in which it is necessary to add a provision.

66. Roeland de Bruin, Autonomous Intelligent Cars on the European Intersection of
Liability and Privacy. Regulatory Challenges and the Road Ahead, 7 EUR. J. RISK. REG. 485,
491 (2016) (observing that “the current framework on product liability does not provide an easy
toolkit for consumers to hold AIC manufacturers liable for defects in their products”).
67. Council Directive 85/374, art. 6(2), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31 (EEC).
68. Id., art. 7(b), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31. See Gert Straetmans & Dimitri Verhoeven,
Product Liability Directive, in EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY. AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE
OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 40, 60–61 (Piotr Machnikowski ed., 2016).
69. Directive 85/374, art. 7(e), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31 (EEC).
70. See Simon Whittaker, Introduction to Fault in Product Liability, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 1, 27 (Simon Whittaker ed., 2010) (stating that “there
are number of issues on which the Directive is not clear and, in particular, where it leaves
concepts undefined or only partially defined”).
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1. Eliminating the Development Risk Defence
Through what has been termed the “development risk
defen[s]e,” 71 the Product Liability Directive provides that a producer is
exonerated from liability if the state a producer bears no liability if the
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time in which the
product was put into circulation was insufficient to uncover the
defect. 72
The presence of the provision inspired significant disagreement
among Member States during the procedure that led to the enactment
of the Directive. 73 The difficulties in finding an agreement led to the
possibility of omitting the rule in implementing the Directive. 74 The
aim of the exoneration ground is clear: manufacturers should not be
deterred from investing in new products and technological innovation.
Nevertheless, the final wording of the provision adopted by the EU
lawmakers raised some doubts. In fact, commentators had to tackle the
unsolved issue of whether the exoneration applied only for absolute
undiscoverability or also for a mere undiscoverability by reasonable
means. The latter interpretation is problematic because it substantially
resembles the fault requirement that, in theory, was abandoned by the
Directive. The ECJ”) could not definitively solve the issue but
expressly declared that the rule refers to the “objective state of
scientific and technical knowledge, including the most advanced level
of such knowledge, without any restriction as to the industrial sector
concerned.” 75 Apart from the different opinions that may exist on its
interpretation, it is indisputable that the practical significance of the
71. Piotr Machnikowski, Product Liability Directive, in EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 68,
62, 77–79.
72. Directive 85/374, art. 7(e), 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 31 (EEC).
73. Mark Mildred, The development risks defence, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 167 (Duncan Fairgrieve ed., 2005); Hans-W. Micklitz, Liability
for Defective Products and Services, in NORBERT REICH, HANS-W. MICKLITZ, PETER ROTT,
KLAUS TONNER, EUROPEAN CONSUMER LAW 239, 263–64 (2d ed., 2014).
74. Directive 85/374, art. 15 (1)(b) 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 33 (EEC): “Each Member State
may: . . . (b) by way of derogation from article 7 (e), maintain or, subject to the procedure set
out in paragraph 2 of this article, provide in this legislation that the producer shall be liable even
if he proves that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the
product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be discovered.”
75. Case C-300/95, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1997, E.C.R. I-2649, paras 26–29.
For a very in-depth analysis of the judgment, see SIMON WHITTAKER, LIABILITY FOR
PRODUCTS. ENGLISH LAW, FRENCH LAW, AND EUROPEAN HARMONISATION 495–502 (2005).
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rule is to shift the risk of injury caused by a new technology onto the
victim and not onto the manufacturer “who reaps the benefits of
distributing the product.” 76
There is poor case law on the legal meaning of the defense, 77 but
its practical significance could dramatically increase due to the
development of technology. Autonomous systems that rely on choices
determined by algorithms pose serious concerns as regards the ground
of exemption. The systems adopt autonomous decisions that could be
wrong and cause harm also if the manufacturer has fulfilled the
required safety duties. 78 It is questionable whether in the future it would
be a suitable solution to wholly eliminate the development risk defense
for AV accident liability. AV manufacturers should at any rate not
escape liability if the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the
time when the AV was put into circulation was not yet advanced
enough to allow for the delegation of the behavior at issue to
algorithmic decisions. Every decision taken by the software that
amounts to a defect, i.e. that does not entail the safety which a person
is entitled to expect, 79 should trigger strict liability. As it is, single
Member States, due to the option provided by the Product Liability
Directive, could adopt such a measure with reference to AV
manufactures. 80 However, especially to assure competition in the
single market and a high level of protection for the victims, it seems
preferable to exclude the development risk defense by means of
European legislative intervention.
2. Discovering a Defect in the Design
The more important difference between conventional vehicles and
AVs is that crashes involving the latter could be caused by the hardware
and software components of the operating system. 81 In tackling the
problems of AVs, it is useful to adopt the Anglo-American distinction

76. Machnikowski, supra note 71, at 78.
77. Cf. Mildred, supra note 73, at 170–72; Micklitz, supra note 73, at 265–66.
78. Teubner, supra note 65 at 190. See also the critics of Antonio Davola, A Model for
Tort Liability in a World of Driverless Cars: Establishing a Framework for the Upcoming
Technology, 54 IDAHO L. REV. 591, 600 (2018).
79. See infra Part IV.C.2.
80. ANDREU et al., supra note 32, at 108–09.
81. Mark A. Geistfeld, The Regulatory Sweet Spot for Autonomous Vehicles, 53 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 337, 354–57 (2018).
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between different types of defects, namely “manufacturing defects”
and “design defects.” 82
In its recent communication, the Commission has proposed that
AVs be fitted with data recorders in order to clarify who was driving
during an accident, namely the software or the driver. 83 Additionally,
the EU Parliament has indicated the need for clear legislation
obligating the installation of event data recorders “in order to clarify
and enable the tackling, as soon as possible, of issues of liability.” 84
The importance of data recording must be stressed because such
recording would make it possible to understand ex post what events
actually caused the damage, which is a decisive issue for the attribution
of liability. Where a full automation level has been engaged, 85 it can be
assumed that passengers do not devote attention to what happens on the
road, and in the event of an accident they would not be able to
reconstruct the events that led to the damage. 86
Assuming that by means of track recording it will be possible to
demonstrate the events that led to an accident, an additional important
issue remains: was the accident caused by a defect? In this respect,
difficult questions arise with regard to the qualification of a design
defect in cases in which the AVs operating system is fully functioning.
How can one assess the existence of a defect in the design? Is an
incorrect decision made by the software that drives the vehicle enough
to consider the AV defective? Can a crash be considered proof of
defective design?
On these issues, an article recently published by author Mark
Geistfeld attempted to apply settled product liability doctrines to AVs
82. Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-American products liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 73, at 295, 300–02; Lauren Sterret, Product Liability:
Advancements in European Union Product Liability Law and Comparison between the EU and
the U.S. Regime, 23 MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 885, 893–903 (2015); Michael D. Green &
Jonathan Cardi, United States of America, in EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITY. AN ANALYSIS OF
THE STATE OF THE ART IN THE ERA OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES, supra note 68, at 575, 585–89.
83. EU Strategy for Mobility, supra note 2, at 10.
84. EUR. PARL. 2014-2019 Committee on Transport and Tourism, 2018/2089(INI) “on
autonomous driving in European transport” (July 20, 2018).
85. Reference is made to the criteria provided by the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE): Level 5 describes a System that “can cope with all situations automatically during the
entire journey. No driver required” (see https://www.sae.org/standards/content/j3016_201401/)
[https://perma.cc/W89U-PTRV].
86. LENNART S. LUTZ, AUTOMATISIERTES FAHREN, DASHCAMS UND DIE SPEICHERUNG
BEWEISRELEVANTER DATEN 29 (2017).
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in order to outline a roadmap for future regulation. 87 The starting point
of the examination is the fact that “AVs will transform the
individualized behavior of human drivers into a collective,
systematized form of driving.” 88 A single driver, the software, will
have the capacity to drive an entire fleet of AVs and determine their
movements. Another important assumption of the analyzed study is
that the AV’s operating system will be designed in a manner that is not
completely safe. 89 Users will also have to accept a certain risk when
deciding to be transported by an AV and, of course, they must be
warned by the manufacturers about the inherent safety risks related to
AVs.
In this future scenario, premarket testing plays an important role
and permits detection of whether an AV fulfills the required safety
expectation. In particular, it is proposed that the manufacturer would
be providing a safe design if the aggregate premarket testing data shows
that the fleet of fully functioning autonomous vehicles performs at least
twice as safe as conventional vehicles. 90 To avoid liability for AV
crashes, a manufacturer who respects the indicated safety benchmark
must only adequately warn consumers about this inherent risk. 91 In
Geistfeld’s contribution, Waymo was chosen as a reliable premarket
testing example. 92 AV operating systems are learning machines that

87. Mark A. Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability,
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1611, 1621–24
(2017).
88. Id. at 1632–34.
89. Id. at 1635. See also Karni A. Chagal-Feferkorn, Am I an Algorithm or a Product?
When Products Liability Should Apply to Algorithmic Decision-Makers, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 61, 84 (2019) (“sophisticated systems, in particular self-learning algorithms, rely on
probability-based predictions, and probabilities by nature inevitably “get it wrong” some of the
time”).
90. Geistfeld, supra note 87, at 1651–52. The above-mentioned parameter is based on a
risk-utility test. Contra Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and
Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. L.
REV. 127, 142–45 (2019).
91. Geistfeld, supra note 87, at 1654–56. The author further explains that on the basis of
this data, auto insurers can establish the risk-adjusted annual premium for insuring the vehicle.
Through the disclosure of such a premium to the consumers, the manufacturer would satisfy its
obligation to warn of the inherent risk of crash, “eliminating this final source of manufacturer
liability for crashes caused by a fully functioning autonomous vehicle.”
92. For an explanation of the premarket testing techniques currently used by Waymo, see
Andrew J. Hawkins, Inside Waymo’s strategy to grow the best brains for self-driving cars. The
Google spinoff has a head start in AI, but can they maintain the lead?, THE VERGE (May 9,
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through testing acquire experience in order to prevent accidents. It is
further argued that AV crashes are substantially different than those
caused by humans. 93 An AV could encounter difficulties in what is
termed “corner cases,” very peculiar scenarios that were not addressed
during the premarket testing. 94
Taking into consideration all the listed features of AVs, it is
contended that in order to ascertain the presence of a design defect in
an AV which has been involved in a crash caused by the AV’s fully
functioning operating system, an overall assessment of the systemized
driving should be made through performance data for the fleet,
regardless of the particular circumstances of the crash. 95 In other words,
one has to consider whether the fleet fulfills the safety requirements
independent of what happened in the particular case because AVs do
not act like humans and their behavior depends on an operating system
that is embedded in an entire fleet of vehicles. This means that
respecting the safety rate previously specified (i.e. half the accidents of
conventional vehicles) would permit escape from liability (if the
consumer was properly informed of the product’s inherent risks) no
matter what the circumstances of the accident were.
It is clear that the liability test depends on the way in which courts
will formulate the expectation of how a fully functioning operating
system should execute the dynamic driving task. The above discourse
has a strong impact on the standards that have to be taken into
consideration in evaluating the safety expectations of the users.
According to the described view, it is wrong to compare the behavior
of a single AV with that of a hypothetical reasonable human driver
facing the same traffic situation (referred to as the “anthropocentric
standard”). 96 The safety expectation must be assessed with the overall
data concerning the fleet (i.e. the total number of crashes over a certain
period of time).

2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/9/17307156/google-waymo-driverless-cars-deeplearning-neural-net-interview [https://perma.cc/7X5V-7XF3].
93. Geistfeld, supra note 87, at 1651.
94. HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, DRIVERLESS: INTELLIGENT CARS AND THE ROAD
AHEAD 4–5 (2016).
95. Id.
96. Teubner, supra note 65, at 164–65.
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In the absence of clear rules concerning the safety expectations in
product liability, 97 the theory has gained approving support by a
European scholar. 98 Nevertheless, it does not seem to be acceptable, at
least in the near future when AVs are going to operate together with
conventional vehicles. 99 Not focusing on the circumstances of the crash
means accepting the possibility that an AV’s manufacturer will elude
liability even if in the individual circumstances the vehicle causes a
crash that a human could easily avoid. For instance, in the case that
involved a Tesla in Florida, the operating system confused a tractortrailer with a lit sky and failed to apply the brakes. 100 It is indisputable
that a human concentrating on the driving task would have had the
capacity to prevent the crash. Rejecting the manufacturer’s liability in
such a case would be an unacceptable outcome, even if the operating
system’s data shows that the accident’s rate respects the
aforementioned level of safety. Here, the software replaces human
behavior and, therefore, reasonable human behavior is the first
reference to be taken into consideration as a minimum safety standard
that must be fulfilled by the operating system. 101 It does not mean that
statistics are not a viable way to assess the safety expectations, but
account should be given to data only if it is demonstrated that a
reasonable human driver could not have avoided the crash. In reality,
the suggested assessment of liability based on accident rates similarly
entails a comparison between human behavior, expressed by the
97. Cf. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member states concerning liability for defective
products, art. 6(1), 1985 O.J. (L 210) (“A product is defective when it does not provide the safety
which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: (a) the
presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the product
would be put; (c) the time when the product was put into circulation.”)
98. Wagner, supra note 51, 733–36.
99. See infra Part V.A.
100. Tesla declared that “the vehicle was on a divided highway with Autopilot engaged
when a tractor trailer drove across the highway perpendicular to the Model S. Neither Autopilot
nor the driver noticed the white side of the tractor trailer against a brightly lit sky, so the brake
was not applied”: The Tesla Team, A Tragic Loss (June 30, 2016),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/tragic-loss [https://perma.cc/VNP7-YL8Y]. For further analysis, cf.
HANNAH YEEFEN LIM, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES AND THE LAW. TECHNOLOGY, ALGORITHMS
AND ETHICS 33–50 (2018).
101. Teubner, supra note 65, at 194: (“Anfangs wird sich das Rechtswidrigkeitsurteil an
den Fähigkeiten menschlicher Akteure orientieren. Das aber ist nur der Minimalstandard, der
stets einzuhalten ist”) (At the beginning, the assessment of unlawfulness will be oriented on
human capabilities. However, it represents just a minimum standard that must be fulfilled in any
case).
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accident rate of a group of drivers, and the AVs’ fleet behavior,
expressed by a different accident rate. The distinction does not have a
qualitative nature, but only a quantitative nature. In a period in which
it is certain that AVs and conventional vehicles are going to be subject
to the same traffic rules, it does not, therefore, seem appropriate to omit
a focus on the specific accident and a comparison of the individual
AV’s response with that of a hypothetical human driver. This is
particularly important for reasons of deterrence. Liability could more
strongly induce manufacturers to learn from their mistakes and to
improve or update their systems.
The indicated minimum standard of the reasonable human will not
remain applicable forever. In the future, in a context where only linked
AVs will circulate on the roads, 102 traffic will look completely different
than it is now. For instance, it can be expected that traffic lights will
disappear, given that all the vehicles will be able to calculate the
movements of other vehicles and decelerate or accelerate as needed in
road intersections. 103 In such a future scenario, the hypothetical
behavior of a human driver will only be a historical artifact useless for
resolving issues of liability. Instead, the benchmark in order to assess
the presence of a defect could predominantly be based on data related
to the performances of different AV operating systems. 104
3. A Duty to Observe the Product
The type of product under examination makes it difficult to accept
the applicability of the rule contained in the Product Liability Directive,
according to which a product is not to be considered defective for the
102. See infra Part V.A.
103. Chris Smith, MIT Thinks it Can Create a World Without Traffic Lights, BGR,
March
18,
2016,
https://bgr.com/2016/03/18/mit-smArt.-intersection-traffic-lights/
[https://perma.cc/FQ95-V5X4]. With respect to smart traffic, engineers are currently
working on new solutions built upon slot-based systems similar to those commonly used in aerial
traffic: see in particular Remi Tachet et al., Revisiting Street Intersections Using Slot-Based
Systems,
11(3)
PLOS ONE
2016,
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0149607
[https://perma.cc/U4E3-SSNQ].
104. See Wagner, supra note 51, at 735–37, 764–65. See also Karni Chagal-Feferkorn,
The Reasonable Algorithm, 1 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 111, 116-17 (2018) (trying to develop
a “reasonable algorithm” standard applicable to non-human decision makers); Eric Tjong Tjin
Tai, Liability for (semi)autonomous systems: robots and algorithms, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON DATA SCIENCE AND LAW 55, at 72 (Vanessa Mak, Eric Tjong Tjin Tai & Anna Berlee eds.,
2018) (discussing the development of the criterion of a “reasonable robot” or “reasonable
algorithm”).
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sole reason that a better product is subsequently put into circulation.105
Beginning with the ways to assess the defectiveness of the product, the
Directive focuses on the moment when the product is put into
circulation as the relevant point in time. 106 This characteristic does not
fit with a deep learning operating system such as the one embedded in
AVs. Such technology is able to learn from mistakes and to ameliorate
its performances through experience. It is possible that shortcomings
in the functioning of the AVs could come to light only after the product
is put into circulation. If this were the case, it would be advisable for
manufacturers to react in order to fix the previously unknown problem
with respect to the entire fleet of AVs. In other words, where it is
possible to align a product with the safety level of products
subsequently put into circulation through a mere update of the software,
it must be done.
It is arguable that in cases of risks for passengers and bystanders,
the manufacturers’ policy would be to recall the AVs and fix the
problem anyways. However, due to the inherent risks, it would be
better to provide for a specific observation duty extended to the entire
fleet of autonomous vehicles. Observation duties on products are
known to some legal systems, 107 as for instance in Germany, where
pursuant to rulings of the Federal Court manufacturers have a duty
towards the community to observe their products and detect potential
damaging features and inform themselves of risks deriving from
usage. 108 It is observed that the AVs’ manufacturers will easily have
the opportunity to control the functioning of their connected operating
systems and that the duty to observe will, therefore, be strictly
evaluated. 109 The problem is to understand what exactly the
manufacturers’ duties are when a situation of risk is detected. Should
they merely warn the users about the risks, or is a positive action
105. Council Art Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws,
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member states concerning liability for defective
products, art. 6(2), 1985 O.J. L 210 art. 6(2), 1985 O.J. L 210 (EEC).
106. On the notion of defect, see also Id. art. 6(1).
107. See, with regard to U.S., German and French Law, JEAN-SEBASTIAN BORGHETTI, LA
RESPONSABILITE DU FAIT DES PRODUITS. ÉTUDE DE DROIT COMPARE 79–80, 132–34, 331–33
(2004). On Council Directive 85/374, art. 13, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 32 (EEC) and the
relationship between national and European harmonized rules, see Whittaker, supra note 70, at
24–26.
108. On the so-called “Produktbeobachtungspflichten”, see Gomille, supra note 51, at 79–
80; Wagner, supra note 51, at 750–51; Ebers, supra note 52, at 112–13.
109. Gomille, supra note 51, at 80; Wagner, supra note 51, at 750.

2019]

THE EUROPEAN ROAD

149

required? The German Federal Court has been reluctant in imposing
more than a duty to warn. 110 This is predominantly due to the high costs
associated with the recall of products and modification of their design.
Things may be different with AVs, given that very good results could
be achieved through simple updates of the software. 111 It seems that an
observation duty should be regulated at a European level in order to
avoid inconsistencies between Member States’ laws that could impair
competition in the single market and yield imbalances in the level of
protection.
The observation duty would be of special importance also to avoid
effects that could be detrimental to the development of technology. As
is well known, the ECJ has ruled that “where it is found that products
belonging to the same group or forming part of the same production
series, such as pacemakers and implantable cardioverter defibrillators,
have a potential defect, such a product may be classified as defective
without there being any need to establish that that product has such a
defect.” 112 Even if AVs could entail great risks for the personal safety
of the involved people, it seems wrong to automatically extend the
assessment of defectiveness to an entire fleet. The ECJ judgment
scrutinized a very peculiar product that is difficult to inspect, and
therefore one has to be careful in extending the reasoning to other
products. 113 At any rate, to avoid any uncertainty on the issue it seems
worthwhile to clarify that the occurrence of a single accident, caused
by a design defect, does not necessarily imply the defectiveness of the
entire fleet which has embedded the same operating system. In these
cases, the fulfillment of the observation duty and, potentially, an update
of the software could be sufficient to protect against liability.
V. TOMORROW’S TRAFFIC LIABILITY
In trying to determine if there is a need to change the actual
regulatory framework, one has to consider that the rules on tort are
110. Wagner, supra note 51, at 754–55.
111. Id.
112. Boston Scientific Medizintechnik GmbH v. AOK Sachsen-Anhalt. Die
Gesundheitskasse, Betriebskrankenkasse, Joined Cases 503/13 & 504/13, [2015], E.C.R. I
(delivered March 5, 2015).
113. Cf. André Janssen, Die Produkthaftungsrichtlinie von der Wiederbelebung?,
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DAS PRIVATRECHT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION [GPR] 236, 237 (2015)
(Ger.); Straetmans & Verhoeven, supra note 68, at 56.
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mainly based on the rationale that the liable person is the one who has
created a risk that materializes in some manner of damage.114
Following this paradigm, it is therefore appropriate that the owner or
keeper of the vehicle has to internalize the risk through insurance. The
indicated persons usually have control of the motor car. 115 They decide
when and where to use it, how to use it and who can use it. The accident
probabilities are strictly related to those choices and, to a certain extent,
reflected in the price of insurance. The AVs’ behavior, by contrast,
depends on choices made by an algorithm and on the capacity of
machine vision software to “read” certain situations. 116
Due to the complete automation, it is obvious that the liability of
the driver will disappear with AVs operating at Level 5. 117 If the
behavior of the vehicle no longer depends on the conduct of the driver,
there is no way to make her liable for an accident. However, the
position of the keeper of an AV is less evident. The keeper decides
when and where to use the vehicle, but she is not responsible in terms
of how the vehicle behaves. In using the AV, she has made only a
choice about the vehicle company and the embodied software. Is this
enough to maintain the liability scheme as it currently stands in many
jurisdictions–namely, to impose strict liability on the keeper and to
require compulsory insurance?
A. From the Keeper to the Manufacturer
The question of who has to cover the risk has gained attention at
various levels. An ethics commission established by the German
Ministry for Transport and Digital Infrastructure–and charged with
addressing the ethical and legal problems related to autonomous
114. See Stephen Perry, Torts, Rights and Risks, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 38, 45 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014) (“The basic idea is that risk itself is a form of
harm, and we are duty-bound not to subject others to (unreasonable) levels of risk because to do
so is to harm them”); Matthew Dyson, What does Risk-Reasoning Do in Tort Law?, in
REGULATING RISK THROUGH PRIVATE LAW 455, 511 (Matthew Dyson ed., 2018). See also
GERT BRÜGGEMEIER, COMMON PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW: A PRE-STATEMENT OF LAW 82–92
(2004).
115. VON BAR, supra note 39, at 409 (“So long and in so far as one recognizes the risk
theory as the basis of strict liability, liability for road vehicles must lie with the keeper”).
116. Alberto Broggi et al., Intelligent Vehicles, in SPRINGER HANDBOOK OF ROBOTICS
1627–56 (Bruno Siciliano & Oussama Khatib eds., 2d ed. 2016).
117. See criteria provided by the Society of Automotive Engineers, reported supra note
85.
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driving–has asserted that new rules for AVs should take into
consideration the fact that responsibility for the vehicle’s behavior will
shift from the driver to the manufacturer and the different subjects who
have the power to take decisions with respect to the regulation of traffic
and the maintenance of the relevant infrastructure. 118 Scholars have
reacted in different ways. It is argued that the liability of the keeper will
continue to dominate the setting and that product liability will be of
importance only in cases of regress by the insurance company or where
the liability of the keeper does not cover the loss. 119 According to a
divergent view, it is argued that manufacturers must be held strictly
liable for crashes of AVs operating at the highest level of
automation. 120 The indicated reason is that manufacturers are, with
their exhaustive knowledge of the software, better positioned “to
control the risks and balance the benefits and costs of the technologies
that are “driving” fully autonomous cars.” 121
The latter conclusion cannot be disputed, but a reliable assessment
must necessarily take into consideration also the impact on the
vehicles’ prices. It seems convincing to state that making the vehicle
companies strictly liable would probably result in the cost of insurance
being shifted from the keeper to the manufacturer. In any event, product
liability will have the effect of making vehicles more expensive given
that manufacturers have to spread the costs of liability among its
customers. 122 Assuming that the overall risk of accidents depends on
the volume of use of the vehicles, this could lead to an unsatisfactory
situation where customers who do not frequently use the vehicles

118. BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR VERKEHR UND DIGITALE INFRASTRUKTUR EthikKommission [FED. MINISTRY OF TRANSP. AND DIG. INFRASTRUCTURE ETHICS-COMM’NEthicCommission], Automatisiertes und Vernetztes Fahren [ETHIC-COMMISSION FOR AUTONOMOUS
AND
CONNECTED
DRIVING
REPORT]
§
III(10),
https://www.bmvi.de/SharedDocs/DE/Publikationen/DG/bericht-der-ethikkommission.pdf?__blob=publicationFile [https://perma.cc/W9ZT-KVQR].
119. Wagner, supra note 51, at 759–61.
120. Eidenmüller, supra note 57, at 772–73. See also, with reference to the United States,
Adam Rosenberg, Strict Liability: Imagining a Legal Framework for Autonomous Vehicles, 20
TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 208, 218–22 (2017) (advocating for AVs the application of the
strict liability framework of early aviation); David Goldstein, Autonomous Vehicles Will Drive
Themselves - But They Won’t Regulate Themselves, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 241, 254–56 (2017).
121. Eidenmüller, supra note 57, at 772.
122. Wagner, supra note 51, at 763.
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subsidize customers who do make significant use of them. 123 It is
posited that such problems also affect the liability of the keeper in cases
where the amount of the insurance premium is not based on the use of
the vehicle. 124 This is certainly true, but there are also other important
tariff criteria related to the keeper that do not fit neatly with a fleet of
fully autonomous vehicles. For instance, in establishing a premium for
third party insurance, the following elements are taken into
consideration in evaluating the risk: age, years as licensed driver,
educational level and of course the ability of the keeper in managing
the risks, all controlled through the “bonus-malus” system that adjusts
the premiums paid by a customer based on her individual claim
history. 125
It is evident that pricing and insurance play an important role in
creating the right incentives for manufacturers and in influencing the
choices of customers. In the present contribution, the issue will be
addressed under two different scenarios: a near future where AVs will
coexist with conventional vehicles and a more distant future in which
roads will be populated exclusively by AVs.
B. The Near Future: A Competition between New and Old
In the near future, compulsory insurance law could play an
important role in supporting the use of AVs during the time in which
the latter is going to be on the road together with conventional vehicles.
If we assume that the legal system should work to maximize the
benefits derived from technology and deter the use of conventional
vehicles, or at least nudge people towards abandoning them, placing
liability on the keeper/owner (or the insurer) and requiring compulsory
insurance on the part of the owner could generate a beneficial

123. Id. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in leasing contracts and other types of long
term leases, which are becoming a widespread way to join vehicles, a maximum annual mileage
is normally foreseen and it influences the amount of the lease.
124. Id.
125. For an overall assessment, see Ulrich Meyer, Motor Liability Insurance in Europe.
Comparative Study of the Economic-Statistical Situation, in PANEUROPÄISCHE
TARIFSTRUKTUR IN DER KFZ-HAFPFLICHTVERSICHERUNG 35, 43–48 (Jürgen Basedow et al.
eds., 2005). For the more recent developments on the “pay-as-you-drive” schemes related to
data processing, see Jan Lüttringhaus, Mehr Freiheit wagen im Versicherungsrecht durch datenund risikoadjustierte Versicherungstarife, in “MEHR FREIHEIT WAGEN.” BEITRÄGE ZUR
EMERITIERUNG VON JÜRGEN BASEDOW 55, 58 (Anatol Dutta & Christian Heinze eds., 2018).
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competition between the new (AVs) and the old (conventional
vehicles).
Even after the launch of AVs, there will be people who prefer to
drive rather than be transported by a computer program that decides on
the destiny of passengers, be it motivated by fear, the pleasure of
driving, or economic reasons. 126 The point in time at which a formal
ban of conventional vehicles will be enacted seems to be still far off. 127
The acceptance of the new technology and the willingness to
definitively prohibit conventional vehicles will probably require a
degree of generational change. 128 Several elements are going to
accompany this evolution, and transformation still began, at least in the
Western countries. There is a significant trend to abandon private
vehicle ownership in favor of the shared automobiles which
increasingly transport people around in urban settings. 129 Public
measures such as banning private motor cars from city centers because
of pollution will additionally prompt a change in habits. In this context,
an important tool for increasing awareness – among all stakeholders –
about the advantages of AVs could be a regime of strict liability
imposed on the owner/keeper (or the British regulation which formally
places the liability on the insurer) 130 as it nowadays exists in several
legal systems; also of value is a requirement of compulsory insurance.
As discussed earlier, the European Commission 131 does not
perceive a need to change the compulsory insurance scheme provided
by the Motor Insurance Directive. The reasons for this choice are
basically related to the position of the harmed individuals who must
126. On the issues related to societal acceptance see the empirical study of Eva Fraedrich
& Barbara Lenz, Societal and Individual Acceptance of Autonomous Driving, in AUTONOMOUS
DRIVING: TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS, supra note 61, at 622-40.
127. See John Naughton, The Crucial Flaw of Self-driving Cars? They Will Always Need
Human
Involvement,
THE
GUARDIAN,
(July
15,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/15/crucial-flaw-of-self-driving-carsalways-need-human-involvement [https://perma.cc/Q52J-F7YS].
128. Cf. the empirical evidence provided by Ingo Wolf, The Interaction Between Humans
and Autonomous Agents, in AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL
ASPECTS, supra note 61, at 103, 110–18.
129. Wagner, supra note 51, at 764. With respect to the United States, compare Nora F.
Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
293, 295–96 (2018).
130. Also with respect to the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, it seems that the
risk is covered by the owner through the compulsory insurance regulation. See supra Section
III.C.
131. See supra Parts I and II.
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continue to rely on a system capable of granting full compensation in
cases of accidents. 132 The situation of a driverless vehicle which hits a
different driverless vehicle could easily be resolved by holding, in
accord with the current legal framework of many countries, the keeper
of the first AV strictly liable. 133 Her insurance will then cover the
inflicted damage.
Such a paradigm could not be considered optimal in the long run
because it does not saddle liability onto the “cheapest cost avoider,”
which in our case is undoubtedly the manufacturer who has control
over the functioning of the technology and the capacity to assess the
causation of an accident. 134 An advantage of this regime is the fact that
through insurance market mechanisms the desirability of AVs could
prevail over conventional vehicles. It can be predicted that insurance
for AVs will ultimately be significantly cheaper than insurance for
conventional vehicles. As has often been discussed, AVs will be
allowed on the road once it has been demonstrated that they are able to
systematically drive in a reasonably safe manner with at least half the
incidence of crashes relative to conventional vehicles. 135 This means
that the lower risk of accidents will surely reduce the costs of insurance
policies. 136 Additional reductions may derive from the fact that AVs
are always trackable. This could prevent manipulations by the
policyholders and simplify the ascertainment of what brought about
accidents 137, and sophisticated smart contracts might be structured.138
132. Wagner, supra note 51, at 760.
133. See supra Part III. See also, with reference to French law, ANDREU et al., supra note
34, at 92–93.
134. See infra Section V.C.
135. Geistfeld, supra note 87, at 1651 et seq.; Wagner, supra note 51, at 734–35.
136. With respect to the tariff criteria adopted by insurance companies, see Meyer, supra
note 125, at 40 et seq. But see JEFFREY W. STEMPEL & ERIK S. KNUTSEN, STEMPEL AND
KNUTSEN ON INSURANCE COVERAGE 38–39 (4th ed., 2019) (“the claims amount at stake in the
aggregate may not dissipate as one would expect, as class actions could potentially obviate the
launching of suits against manufacturers on behalf of owners of entire lines of vehicles”). It has
to be noted that, differently than in the U.S., in Europe tort class actions are traditionally
unknown: see for comparative remarks on algorithmic torts, Infantino & Wang, supra note 51,
at 33–34 (arguing that in European jurisdictions, in which new class action regimes have been
implemented, there has been relatively little use of the procedure to date).
137. See Ina Ebert, Automatisiertes Fahren aus Sicht der Versicherer, in AUTONOME
SYSTEME UND NEUE MOBILITÄT 65, 68–69 (Eric Hilgendorf ed., 2017) (referring to ongoing
studies of insurance companies on the impact that AV technology may have on insurance
premiums).
138. See Angelo Borselli, Smart Contracts in Insurance: A Law and
Futurology
Perspective,
in
DEMYSTIFYING
INSURTECH
(forthcoming)
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The cheaper premiums will represent an important development
especially for car-sharing companies which have the possibility to
extend the reduced cost of insurance onto an entire fleet of vehicles.
Such an implementation of new mobility concepts could have a pivotal
role in familiarizing people with the new technology and making them
aware of the benefits related to AVs. All these elements could give a
competitive advantage to new technology and expose the shortcomings
of conventional vehicles. On the other hand, the cost of insurance for
conventional vehicles could increase. One can presume that repair costs
for AVs’ will, due to the used technology (sensors, cameras, etc.), be
higher than those associated with conventional vehicles. Consequently,
where a human driver crashes into and damages an AV, her insurance
company will have to pay higher amounts, which in turn will augment
the insurance premiums and create an additional competitive advantage
for AVs. 139
It should also be noted that, from a legislative point of view, the
choice not to modify the compulsory insurance regime and the basic
features of liability does not result in a fragmentation of the legal
system. One regime will cover both situations and influence the choices
of the customers. Such a solution seems particularly appropriate when
considering current driverless technologies permit an occupant of the
vehicle to take over control. In addition, such a regulatory framework
could also encourage technological development because usually it
would not put manufacturers in the front line of a liability claim.140
Further, in the majority of cases, the dispute over financial
responsibility would be exclusively between professional players,
insurance companies and manufacturers, 141 and the absence of lay
parties–already satisfied by insurance companies–would probably lead
to an increase in extrajudicial settlements. Finally, people involved in
accidents will continue to rely on the same proceedings to secure

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3318883
[https://perma.cc/7WWCZFSN] (arguing that “a sophisticated smart contract might be structured, envisioning a future
where, with the advent of driverless cars, the smart contract might even direct the car itself to an
accredited garage for its repairment”).
139. Cf. Jan Eichelberger, Autonomes Fahren und Privatversicherungsrecht, in
AUTONOMES FAHREN. RECHTSFOLGEN, RECHTSPROBLEME, TECHNISCHE GRUNDLAGEN, supra
note 52, at 127, 129.
140. See supra Part IV.A.
141. Wagner, supra note 51, at 761.
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compensation, and this will additionally help to enhance the level of
confidence in new technologies.
C. A More Distant Future: Only Autonomous Vehicles on the Road
The preference for private vehicles is less prevalent than in the
past. Car-sharing fleets are invading cities all across Europe and are
offering high flexibility to their customers. Vehicles are available at
any time and for any duration, without the need to book them or to plan
the journey in advance. It is argued that, with AVs, it is possible to
significantly extend the existing mobility concepts. 142 A time will come
when users will no longer go to vehicles located by their smartphone
apps; they will instead simply demand them through their devices. This
technology could eliminate the issue of physical distance between
humans and vehicles and help people with impaired mobility.
In the near future, this transformation of custom will impact the
insurance market and alter accident liability, making the assessment
and the compensation of damages caused by vehicles a question to be
resolved between large enterprises. How should the legal system react
to these changes? There is no need to dramatically modify the liability
scheme or the compulsory insurance regime. Compared to the “nofault” schemes adopted by some legal systems, especially in North
America and New Zealand, 143 the current European legal framework
seems to provide a valuable mechanism for ensuring the proper
incentives and avoiding the risks of undercompensation.144
142. Barbara Lenz & Eva Fraedrich, New Mobility Concepts and Autonomous Driving:
The Potential for Change, in AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL
ASPECTS, supra note 61, at 174.
143. For a general assessment of the common law experience, see Ken Oliphant,
Landmarks of No-Fault in the Common Law, in SHIFTS IN COMPENSATION BETWEEN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC SYSTEMS 43, 56–60 (Willem H. van Boom & Michael Faure eds., 2007).
144. Kötz, supra note 25, at 1455–58. See also Shill, supra note 3, at 71–72. Completely
“no-fault” schemes could eventually be taken into consideration in a final stage of technological
development, where the accident rate will be close to zero and deterrence will no longer be an
issue. Compare Kevin Funkhouser, Note, Paving the Road Ahead: Autonomous Vehicles,
Products Liability, and the Need for a New Approach, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 437, 458–59 (2013);
David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89
WASH. L. REV. 117, 146–47 (2014); Maurice Schellekens, No-Fault Compensation Schemes for
Self-Driving Vehicles, 10 LAW INNOVATION & TECH. 314–33 (2018); Abraham & Rabin, supra
note 90, at 145–71 (framing a Manufacturer Enterprise Liability, “MER”, able to substitute tort
law); Davola, supra note 78, at 609–12 (arguing the possibility to provide a system based on
compensation paid by a fund created through taxes and payments of manufacturers, where for
every crash an authority would – nevertheless – check the existence of negligence); Richard
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Nevertheless, the need to enhance the preventive effects of accident
liability requires, at least, a prima facie shift in the party who has to
fulfill the duty to insure the vehicle. 145 Specifically, the burden will no
longer fall on the owners/keepers, who definitely lost control of the
vehicle, but on the manufacturers. The insurance cost will thus become
a component of the market price of the vehicles or an additional service
offered by the manufacturers. The costs of insurance will therefore
presumably still fall on the owners/keepers, but the insurance tariffs
will not be influenced by the behavior of the latter. In order to promote
this new paradigm, AV manufacturers have to demonstrate that their
products do not pose an unreasonable risk.146 To create confidence in
the market, in the near future it is therefore very important to continue
placing liability on the keeper, as was indicated above. 147
The described change in the law would have the benefit of placing
liability on the “cheapest cost avoider,” 148 the figure able to control the
sources of risk and internalize the costs and the level of the activity. 149
At this stage, the competition would only be between manufacturers of
AVs, and the insurance costs, reflected in the price, would represent an
important factor apt to drive market choices in a satisfactory way. The
price will also be related to the risk of accidents and, therefore, to the
level of safety that the specific AV can guarantee. Not having the
LoRicco, Autonomous Vehicles: Why We Need Them, but Are Unprepared for Their Arrival, 36
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 297, 321–24 (2018). On the shift from tort law to a social welfare system,
see Bussani & Infantino, supra note 19, at 81.
145. On the preventive effect of tort law in car accident liability, cf. NILS JANSEN, DIE
STRUKTUR DES HAFTUNGSRECHT 173–78 (2003) (Ger.). For a general assessment, also with
regard to the Principles of European Tort Law, see LA FUNZIONE DETERRENTE DELLA
RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE ALLA LUCE DELLE RIFORME STRANIERE E DEI PRINCIPLES OF
EUROPEAN TORT LAW (Pietro Sirena ed., 2011) (Ita.).
146. Bryant Walker Smith, Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, in AUTONOMOUS
DRIVING: TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS, supra note 61, at 571, 576. (Markus
Maurer et al. eds., 2016).
147. See supra Part V.A.
148. Cf. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1960); Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055,
1060–84 (1972).
149. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 66–67 (1987). But see Steven Shavell, On the Redesign of Accident Liability for the World
of Autonomous Vehicles (August 19, 2019), Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center
Discussion Paper No. 1014, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3437474 (proposing a complete different
form of strict liability, than the one described in the text, in which damages would be paid to the
state in order to induce an adequate safety level and a not excessive mileage level by users of
autonomous vehicles).
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keeper be involved in liability issues carries the advantage of
simplifying the assessment of liability and creating certainty as to
which party has to be held liable for the damage. Victims would be
protected through the permissibility of direct actions against the
insurers as they currently are under EU law. Accidents would
subsequently influence the contractual relationships between
manufacturers and insurers and provide for an adaptation of the applied
tariffs consistent with the risks generated by the particular fleet of AVs.
A simplified legal regime eliminates the possible overlap of different
liability schemes that might otherwise create a significant obstacle to
efficient risk management by the players involved.
In this context, an element that could help the manufacturers who
have to bear the costs of risk management is limiting the duration of
risk. 150 Updates, end-user license agreements, and leasing
arrangements could, for instance, enable manufacturers to update or
retire systems that become obsolete. 151 Such concepts would follow
current trends in the market, where leasing and fixed-term contracts are
replacing the model of ordinary sale and induce consumers to change
cars more often than in the past. 152 These changes are also driven by
technology because as it occurs with smartphones, customers
increasingly look to the latest technology. It is arguable that the use of
AVs will become a kind of service offered on the market by different
providers and that vehicle ownership by individual customers will no
longer play a role. 153
D. A Different Product Liability Regime or a New Paradigm of
Traffic Liability?
In light of the problematic issues related to the Product Liability
Directive, it seems clear that in the long run a suitable legal framework
cannot be reached through a mere evolutionary interpretation of the
existing law. After the launch of AVs, the Directive could in the near
150. Smith, supra note 146, at 580.
151. Id.
152. In the U.S., see, e.g., Aaron M. Kessler, Auto Leasing Gains Popularity Among
American
Consumers,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Jan.
8,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/09/business/auto-leasing-gains-popularity-amongamerican-consumers.html [https://perma.cc/5W29-LVGD].
153. See Wagner, supra note 51, at 764-65 (describing the future perspective as follows:
“Von der Eigentümer- zur Dienstleistungmobilität”, which translates to [“From an ownersmobility to a services-mobility”].
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future also remain as it presently stands, 154 and some adjustments may
be provided through the proposed interpretation of the notion of
defect. 155 The development risk defen[s]e could eventually be
inapplicable with respect to algorithms, and a duty to observe the
product should be established.
When AVs become an accepted technology in society, more
significant amendments to the law will certainly be needed. In cases of
accidents, in order to avoid insurmountable difficulties related to
evidence, the injured person will need to identify one single actor that
must be held strictly liable in accord with the law. It seems that the
manufacturer is in the best position to deal with the situation of an
accident, particularly in order to evaluate its liability with respect to the
crash. For instance, in cases of multiple tortfeasors where it is difficult
to ascertain the responsibility for a crash, 156 after having recovered the
damage, the manufacturer or its insurance will eventually file a claim
for relief against the real tortfeasor (e.g. the custodian of the road or an
external hacker). 157 It seems proper to let the manufacturer escape from
liability in cases of force majeure or where the accident was caused by
the negligent behavior of the injured party, as it nowadays happens in
many jurisdictions under the rules on traffic liability.
When trying to imagine what the liability of car manufacturers
will look like in the future, it could be asked whether it would be
adequate to refer to a general product liability regulation or to a new
special traffic liability regime that should affect car manufacturers. The
first option would hinder legal fragmentation, but due to the profound
differences between the technologies and the different interests that
have to be protected within the several sectors of private law, it is
difficult to conceive of a “one-size-fits-all solution” apt to solve in a

154. See supra Part V.A.
155. See supra Part IV.C.
156. For a comparative overview, see UNIFICATION OF TORT LAW. MULTIPLE
TORTFEASORS passim (W.V. Horton Rogers & Willem H. van Boom eds., 2004); SANDY STEEL,
PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 139–60 (2015); Marta Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni,
Summary and Survey of the Results, in CAUSATION IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 587, 646–47
(Marta Infantino & Eleni Zervogianni eds., 2017). On the foundations of collective liability, see
generally ARIEL PORAT & ALEX STEIN, TORT LIABILITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 130–159
(2001).
157. See also Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Public Values, Private
Infrastructure and the Internet of Things: The Case of Automobiles, 9 J.L. & ECON. REG. 7, 7
(2016) (discussing cybersecurity problems related to AVs).
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reasonable way the challenges related to the new technologies.158
Therefore, it seems beneficial to fashion a new concept of traffic
liability with compulsory insurance which will become a prerequisite
for the vehicle being in motion. As was indicated above, in the distant
future insurance should become a matter for vehicle manufacturers as
they will also compete in the market in terms of the amount paid for
insurance premiums, with the latter corresponding to the level of safety
that the AV fleet will be able to assure.
VI. CONCLUSION
AVs entail a disruptive technology that will grossly impact the
behavior of market actors. At this stage, the task of tort law and
insurance law is to provide the right incentives in order to balance the
aim of promoting innovation alongside the need to protect people from
injuries. 159 Immediate and radical changes in the legal framework
would provoke a substantial limitation on individual motorized
mobility. This field calls for a step-by-step approach. People need to
gradually change their habits and acquire confidence in the new
technology. The task of tort law and insurance law is to foster–and not
hinder–technological evolutions that could be beneficial to society
while at the same time avoiding undercompensation.
Some traffic liability schemes adopted in European jurisdictions
seem to offer a valuable solution for the near future, but a comparative
discussion on the issue is missing. By imposing strict liability on the
keeper and by requiring compulsory insurance, they protect victims and
spread the loss among the users of vehicles. The same is true for the
British “Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018,” which, as a
matter of principle, places liability directly on the insurer. 160 Such
approaches could also promote innovation if it were demonstrated that,
compared to conventional vehicles, AVs significantly reduce the
accident rate. In this regard, tariff schemes adopted by insurance
158. See generally Jean-Sébastian Borghetti, How can Artificial Intelligence be
Defective?, in LIABILITY FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS 63, 72
(Sebastian Lohsse, Reiner Schulze, Dirk Staudenmayer eds., 2019) (considering a sector-bysector approach more appropriate to face liability issues of IoT and AI). Cf. Chagal-Feferkorn,
supra note 89, at 87–107 (exposing different features to distinguish between products and
thinking algorithms).
159. On market regulation through tort law, see Jan von Hein, Marktregulierung durch
Deliktsrecht – Zukunftperspektiven der Rechtsvergleichung, in ZUKUNFTPERSPEKTIVEN DER
RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 223, 234–37 (Reinhard Zimmermann ed., 2016) (Ger.).
160. See supra Part III.C.
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companies could play a pivotal role in creating the right incentives in
the market and exercise a deterrent effect.
In the more distant future, if and when exclusively AVs populate
the roads, a shift of liability from the keeper to the manufacturer is
needed. The latter will be in the best position to insure the produced
vehicles. The paid insurance premiums based on the accident rate of
the AV fleet will be reflected in the price of the vehicles and contribute
to fair and beneficial competition between the market actors.
Against this background, the Product Liability Directive should
also be amended in order to provide adequate solutions in accordance
with technological changes. It is clear that there is not a need to change
the rules in order to boost innovation. The Directive contains
provisions that could easily let the manufacturers elude liability. This
has the positive effect of not hindering innovation, but some minor
adjustments are needed in order to produce a sufficient level of
deterrence. A specific interpretation of the design defect must be
elaborated in advance in order to know with certainty just when an AV
with a fully functioning operating system can be considered defective
in the event the AV causes a crash. Undeniably, accidents will not
disappear; subsequent to the launch of AVs it seems correct to refer to
the behavior of a reasonable driver as a kind of minimum standard of
expected safety when attempting to ascertain a design defect. A
comparison between the accident rate of conventional vehicles and the
accident rate of a particular fleet of AVs could be used as an additional
parameter in cases where the minimum standard is fulfilled. In the more
distant future, the manufacturers’ liability should become stricter, as
has happened in some jurisdictions with respect to traffic liability. At
that stage, it would be advisable to create a new set of rules establishing
strict car manufacturer liability for the circulation of AVs.
In conclusion, many issues arise in trying to trace a European road
to autonomous vehicles. The difficult challenges of the new
technologies seem insufficiently tackled by the soft approach adopted
by European institutions. The existing EU law represents only the
starting point, namely a set of rules that grant full compensation and do
not prevent technological development. Discussions held within
national jurisdictions show that the establishment of a consistent
system of liability for AVs at a European level is far from being
reached. Only comparative and interdisciplinary research by European
scholars may provide for the construction of a complete legal
framework capable of competing in the global context.
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